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Abstract
Using a dynamic aggregate supply and aggregate demand model with imperfect capital
mobility and structural VARs, we decompose inflation and output movements into those
attributable to terms of trade, supply, balance-of-payments, fiscal, and monetary shocks. Empirical
results show that terms of trade shocks have a significant effect on inflation in the short run. In the
long run, monetary, and balance of payments shocks dominate while budget deficits play a limited
role in the inflationary process. Demand shocks have limited effects on output movements;
output is mostly driven by terms of trade and supply shocks. The results highlight the importance
of a credible disinflation program and structural reform that restrain discretionary aggregate
demand policies.
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I. Introduction
The Turkish economy has been plagued by high and persistent inflation in the last two
decades. Although the economy grew at reasonable levels, economic growth has been volatile and
macroeconomic instability became the hallmark of the post-1980 period. Despite many attempts to
stabilize the economy, these stabilization attempts have been unsuccessful. Common explanations of
inflation since late 1970s include (1) high public sector deficits (due to, among other things, populist
government expenditures before elections, military expenditures, massive infrastructure projects,
bankrupt social security institutions, losses incurred by state owned enterprises), (2) monetization of
public sector deficits, (3) increases in prices of major imported inputs (particularly, crude-oil prices),
(4) inflationary effects of rising exchange rates via increases in prices of imported goods, (5)
persistent inflationary expectations of economic agents. High and persistent inflation has been blamed
for, among other things, major distortions in the economy,  worsening of the income distribution,
increase in directly unproductive activities, an increase in the underground economy, and curtailing
of foreign direct investment.
The unprecedented hovering of inflation at levels short of hyperinflation over the last two
decades in Turkey poses a challenge yet a systematic macroeconomic account of the underlying
shocks has attracted scant attention in the literature. The main objective of this paper is to examine
the sources of fluctuations in inflation and output growth in Turkey over the last two decades. To that
end, we use a dynamic open-economy aggregate supply aggregate demand model and structural
Vector Autoregressions (VAR) to decompose inflation and output movements into those attributable
to terms of trade, supply, balance of payments, fiscal, and monetary shocks. To our knowledge, this
is the first attempt in documenting the sources of inflation within the context of a dynamic, open-3
economy aggregate supply, aggregate demand model. An advantage of our model is that it does not
assume perfect capital mobility and uncovered interest parity. Moreover, following Quah and Vahey
(1995), we estimate core inflation as inflation driven by aggregate demand shocks in the broad sense.
The issue is germane in that if inflation is driven by shocks to the economic environment or the terms
of trade, the government has little leverage in attempting a successful stabilization program. Finally,
it is possible to decompose output into components driven by particular shocks. The resulting
decomposition may provide an idea on the output costs of disinflation in Turkey. To preview our
results, inflation is mainly driven by terms of trade, balance of payments, and monetary shocks while
output is mostly driven by supply side shocks. Moreover, a substantial portion of inflation is demand-
driven “core inflation.” 
Section II of the paper details major macroeconomic developments since 1970. Section III
presents a selective survey on sources of Turkish inflation. In section IV, we develop a dynamic open
economy aggregate supply - aggregate demand model with imperfect capital mobility to identify
various macroeconomic shocks. Section V presents the empirical results based on variance
decompositions and impulse response functions and estimates “core inflation”. The last section has
the concluding remarks.
II. An Overview of Major Macroeconomic Developments in Turkey
Chronic inflation in Turkey is accompanied by volatile output growth. Year-to-year changes
in consumer prices sampled monthly from January 1970 to December 2002 and some sub-period
averages of these annual inflation rates are shown in Figure 1. As seen in the figure, Turkey
experienced many accelerations in inflation since 1970. Common explanations of these episodes in4
inflation rates are devaluations, oil-price shocks, balance-of-payments crises, public sector deficits,
the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990-1991, financial crises at home and abroad, and recent earthquakes.
( Insert Figure 1 about here )
Figure 2 shows real growth rates for gross domestic product (GDP) of the Turkish
economy. Oil-price shocks in the 1970s and related balance-of-payments problems contributed
substantially to a deep economic recession and a political and social crisis in late 1970s. After the
introduction of a broad stabilization and liberalization program in January 1980, the government
installed by the military regime in September 1980 was able to lower inflation below 40 percent
per year and accelerate economic growth in the following four years. However, after 1983, the
volatility of annual GDP growth rates increased substantially. Other events such as the 1990-1991
Persian Gulf crisis, the 1994 Turkish financial crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, two earthquakes in
1999, and the 2000-2002 disinflation and economic restructuring program which failed in early
2001 contributed to rising output volatility in the economy.
(Insert Figure 2 about here)
On the institutional and policy side, Turkey embarked on far reaching structural reforms
after 1979. In 1980, in response to a strong balance-of-payments crisis accompanied by a deep
recession and accelerated inflation, Turkey abandoned its inward-oriented development strategy
and gradually started to introduce free-market based reforms. The Government devalued the
Turkish lira to eliminate its excess overvaluation, increased the prices of public sector products
and removed restrictions on interest rates.  The first steps of external liberalization concentrated
on current account transactions. The 1980 stabilization and liberalization program was aimed not
only at reducing inflation and accelerating output growth but also hoped to liberalize the capital5
account in a reasonable future. All of these were done at the cost of an initial jump in the annual
inflation rate over 100% in 1980.
In May 1981, the Government took the first step from fixed to a managed floating-
exchange-rate system. In 1984, domestic citizens were allowed to open foreign exchange deposit
(FED) accounts in Turkish banks.  In 1989, the Government took serious steps to liberalize the
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capital account. Following the introduction of convertibility, the overvaluation of the Turkish lira
and high domestic interest rates on government bonds attracted short-term capital inflows to the
country. The change in the deficit financing method of the public sector from money to bond-
finance starting in 1986, and attempts to stabilize the exchange rate to prevent the inflationary
effects of rising exchange rates made this fiscal policy combination unsustainable within a short
period of time. This led to an “exchange-rate” crisis in the first half of 1994 without a “balance-of-
payments” crisis typical of the 1970s. In 1994, the annual inflation rate exceeded 100% as in
1980.
Turkish governments introduced new disinflation measures to stabilize the economy after
the 1994 financial crisis. However, these efforts in 1995, 1998 and 2000 failed to reduce the
inflation rate to levels below 25% per year, as it had been in the early 1970s. Although the
government introduced a three-year program in December 1999, the program had to be revised in
light of the two successive liquidity and interest-rate crises; first in November 2000, and then in
February 2001. The government abandoned the crawling peg regime under the original plan and
floated the Lira in February 2001. The revised three-year plan adopted in early 2002 contained
provisions for fiscal adjustment to help bring about debt sustainability, reform of the banking
sector through an operational and financial restructuring of public banks, and regulation and6
supervision of private banks. The early elections on 3  of November 2002 dramatically changed
rd
the political climate in Turkey; currently the newly established government is in contact with the
International Monetary Fund to make minor changes in the program to disinflate and restructure
the Turkish economy. 
III. Macroeconomic Determinants of Inflation in Turkey: A Selective Survey
There is a large body of literature focusing on specific aspects of post-1979 inflation in
Turkey. These empirical studies differ in their sample period, methodology, and hence, their
conclusions. Using monthly data from 1981-87, Onis and Ozmucur (1990) explore inflationary
dynamics in Turkey. The authors reject a pure monetary explanation of inflation based on a VAR
and a simultaneous equation model. Although they find devaluations of the Turkish lira to have a
strong impact on domestic inflation, supply-side factors seem to have significant effects on
inflation. On the other hand, using annual data from 1960-88, Atesoglu and Dutkowsky (1995)
present supportive evidence  that the Turkish economy behaves consistent with predictions of a
real business cycle model. Particularly they find none of the aggregate demand variables are
significant in influencing output, and prices respond to monetary expansions at the same rate.
Using a broad data set with annual and quarterly data, Metin (1995) finds that fiscal
expansion dominates Turkish inflation from 1950 to 1988. An implication is that, in order to
reduce inflation successfully, governments have to reduce public sector deficits. Moreover,
devaluations have some inflationary effects. Inflationary effects of the depreciation of domestic
currency are also implicated by Erol and van Wijnbergen (1997), Lim and Papi (1997), Agenor
and Hoffmaister (1997), and Leigh and Rossi (2202). The link between devaluations and inflation7
highlights the importance of stabilizing the exchange rate in order to achieve price stability in
Turkey. Using input-output tables, Kibritcioglu and Kibritcioglu (1999) find negligible role of oil
prices on inflation in Turkey. 
Recently, Lim and Papi (1997),  Alper and Ucer (1998), and Baum et al. (1999)
emphasize the increasing role of inertia in the process of inflation in Turkey. This makes
government stabilization attempts difficult given the unusual resistance these disinflationary
measures face. 
( Insert Table 1 about here )
Table 1 presents averages of changes in consumer price index, real GDP, exchange rate,
crude-oil import price, money supply and public sector borrowing requirement in the 1980-2002
period. The figures in last two columns on the current account balance and short-term capital
inflows are given as period averages in millions of US dollars. According to overall figures, the
consumer price index increased 287 times in the 1990-2000 period but it  increased only 53 times
from 1979 to 1989. The recent acceleration of inflation in the 1990s seems to have been
accompanied by a slowdown in output growth. Depreciation of the Turkish lira  also seems to
have accelerated in the 1990s. In real terms, however, the depreciation of the Turkish lira in the
1980s is followed by a slight appreciation in the first half of the 1990s if we ignore changes in
foreign  price levels in the same period. This development along with increases in real domestic
interest rates after 1989 explain the rise in short-term capital inflows in the 1990s. In contrast to
the oil-price shocks of the 1970s, crude-oil price changes in the 1981-1998 period were relatively
small.8
 From 1979 to 2001, the broad money supply M2 has increased substantially which points
to an accommodating monetary policy. In real terms, the M2 measure of the money supply rose
133 percent  while the increase in real reserve-money (the IMF definition) was limited to about 53
percent in the same period. The borrowing requirement of the Turkish public sector (PSBR)
increased in nominal as well as  real terms particularly in the second half of the 1990s. The overall
increase in PSBR in real terms from 1979 to 2001 is about 261 percent. There is  evidence that
monetization of public sector deficits decreased as a result of the availability of bond-financing
since 1986 in Turkey (Alper and Ucer, 1998).  Moreover, Central Bank credits to the public
sector have been sharply declining since 1998. However, sustained monetary growth, despite the
diminishing role of monetization of government deficits, indicates that inflation in Turkey may still
have a monetary character rather than being a fiscal one.
The foregoing discussion highlights the importance of identifying shocks driving inflation
and output, since observed movements in the data are combinations of macroeconomic “shocks”
and responses to these shocks. Did inflation arise because of negative supply shocks? What is the
significance of  terms-of-trade shocks in driving inflation? Do shocks to the balance of payments
play a role in the inflationary process? What role the fiscal deficits played in the inflation process?
In the following two sections, we address these questions using a dynamic aggregate supply
aggregate demand model. We also isolate components of inflation due to particular shocks based
on historical realizations of the shocks. The resulting decomposition can be used to pin down the
size of policy driven inflation vs. inflation due to the macroeconomic environment. It is also
possible to assess the output costs of disinflation.9
IV. Sources of Inflation: An Illustrative AS - AD Model
This section presents a dynamic aggregate supply, aggregate demand model that
incorporates some important elements of a developing economy, namely balance of payments
problems and finite capital mobility. The model is consistent with a vertical long-run Phillips
curve, and represents a middle ground between market clearing approaches and models based on
short run nominal inertia and nominal rigidities.  A similar small, open economy model based on
household optimization can be found in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001). Moreover, Quah and
Vahey (1995) propose a technique for measuring core inflation based on aggregate demand
neutrality: Core inflation is defined as that component of measured inflation that has no long-run
impact on real output, a notion consistent with the vertical long-run Phillips curve. Recently,
Wehinger (2000) use aggregate demand neutrality to derive core inflation for the G7 countries
and we follow a similar strategy in this paper. 
In order to motivate the restrictions embedded in the structural VAR model, consider a
dynamic, open economy aggregate supply- aggregate demand model:
r = r  + ￿ Evolution of terms of trade  (1) tt - 1t
r
y =  ￿ + ￿ r  Aggregate supply  (2) tt  t
s
￿ =  ￿  +  ￿    Evolution of capacity output  (3) tt - 1t
s
k [i - i* + (Es  - s) - ￿] +￿ (s-p) - ￿ y + b = 0    Balance of Payments (BOP) (4) tt t t + 1 t t 1 t t 2 t t
i = (Es  - s) - (￿ /k)  (s-p) + (￿ /k) y + [i* + ￿ - (1/k)b]   (4') t t t+1 t 1 t t 2 t t t t
z = [i* + ￿ - (1/k)b] “BOP” shock   (5) tt t  t
z = z  + ￿ Evolution of “BOP” shock  (5') tt - 1t
z
y =  ￿d - ￿[i- E(p -p)] +  ￿ (s-p) - ￿ y Aggregate  demand/IS  (6) tt t t t + 1 t 1 t t 2 t
d
￿d = - t￿y + ￿ Evolution of the budget deficit (7) tt t
f
m  =  p + y - ￿ i - µz Money demand  (8) tt t t t
d10
￿m =  ￿  ￿d + ￿  ￿z + ￿ Money supply growth (9) t1 t 2 t t
sm
y  = y  = y Goods market equilibrium  (10) ttt
sd
m  = m  = m Money market equilibrium  (11) ttt
sd
where r is the terms of trade, y is domestic output, ￿ is capacity output, i is domestic nominal
interest rate, i* is the foreign interest rate, s is the exchange rate expressed as the domestic
currency price of foreign currency, p is the domestic price level, m is the money stock, d is the
budget deficit, ￿ is a risk premium on domestic currency investments, b  represents an exogenous
shift in net exports due to e.g., a change in competitiveness, z represents exogenous elements in
the balance of payments equation, ￿ are stochastic disturbances, and E is the expectations
j
t
operator conditional on information available at time t. In the model, all variables except interest
rates are in logarithms, and the remaining Greek letters designate parameters which are assumed
positive. 
Equation (1) is the evolution of the terms of trade, which is assumed to follow a random
walk. Equation (2) is an aggregate supply equation, where aggregate supply depends on capacity
output and terms of trade. Capacity output is a function of the productive capacity of the
economy (e.g., the capital stock and employment ), and for simplicity, it is assumed to follow a
random walk. Supply shocks are interpreted broadly to include productivity enhancing
developments such as increases in the capital stock and improvements in technology as well as
“cost-push” elements stemming from input markets.
A distinguishing feature of the model is that, it can accommodate non-instantaneous
adjustment in the balance of payments. Capital inflows are a function of the net domestic rate of
return adjusted for a risk premium. The parameter k represents the degree of capital mobility11
where large values indicate higher levels of capital mobility. The trade balance is a function of the
real exchange rate (s  - p ) and domestic income. Moreover, b  represents exogenous increases in tt t
net exports. Although equation (4) may seem to impose a zero balance of payments, the existence
of the shift term b provides a more general specification. For example, one can view b  as an t t
exogenous level for the balance of payments. Equation (4') rewrites equation (4) in terms of the
domestic nominal interest rate while equation (5) pools all the exogenous elements in the balance
of payments equation to define z. Equation (5') specifies the evolution of z as a non-stationary tt
stochastic process . 
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Equation (6) is an aggregate demand (IS) equation where aggregate spending depends on
the budget deficit, the expected real interest rate, and net exports. The growth in the budget
deficit ￿d  in equation (7) depends negatively on output growth (through increases in tax t
revenues) and a random fiscal shock (￿). Equation (8) is a conventional money demand equation.
f
In order to obtain a simple solution, money demand is assumed to have unitary income elasticity.
Money demand is also a function of the exogenous elements in the balance of payments. This
specification allows for reductions in money demand when there are exogenous shifts in the
balance of payments which may necessitate a depreciation of domestic currency. Moreover, when
there is a risk premium associated with domestic currency or self-fulfilling fads in exchange rate
expectations, z will be positive. In such cases, money demand is reduced by µz . t t
Equation (9) specifies the growth of the money supply as a function of the budget deficit 
and balance of payments. The former captures money creation to finance the government sector 

























































changes in foreign exchange reserves. Finally we close the model by postulating goods and money
market equilibrium relationships (equations 10 and 11) and proceed to solve the model for the
rational expectations equilibrium.
In order to solve the model, we eliminate the interest rate from equations (6) and (8) using
equation (4') to obtain the following system:
The system can be written compactly as AY  = B E  Y  + W, or  Y = ￿ E Y  +CW where C = t t t+1 t t t t+1 t
A   and ￿= A B. The eigenvalues of the matrix ￿ are {1/(1+￿); ￿k / (￿k + ￿ ￿ + k￿ )}. Both 
-1 -1
11
eigenvalues are within the unit circle for finite values of the parameters, hence the forward looking
solution is convergent. The forward looking solution to the system in (12) is
Given the stochastic processes for the exogenous variables, it is evident that E  W  = W for i = 1, tt + i t
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The observed movements in the vector of variables X  = [r  y d (s-p) p]’ are due to five tt t t t t t
mutually uncorrelated “structural” shocks with finite variances, ￿ = [ε  ε  ε  εε]. These are t tttt  t
rsfzm
terms of trade shocks, ε ; aggregate supply shocks, ε ; real fiscal shocks, ε ; BOP shocks, ε ; and tt t t
rs f z
monetary/nominal shocks, ε .  t
m
It can be shown that the long run impact of the structural shocks on the endogenous
variables has a recursive structure. In order to show the long run effect of structural shocks, ε, on t
X, we express the solution to the model in first differences: t
∆r =  ε   (15) tt
r
∆y =  θ ε  + ε  (16) tt t
rs
∆d = -t (ε  + θ ε  ) + ε  (17) tt t t
sr f
Note that the model does not impose a priori restrictions on capital mobility. If capital mobility is
high as may be expected in Turkey especially after the capital account liberalizations undertaken
in the late 1980s, then empirical estimates of the structural parameters would reflect a high k.
What we do not impose is “uncovered interest parity” which would correspond to k tending to
infinity. Equation (19) indicates that the effects of terms of trade, supply, and balance of payments∆Xt ￿ j Ai￿t￿i ￿ A(L)￿t
14
(20)
shocks on inflation can be of either sign. Although all endogenous variables are unit root
stochastic processes, the vector X is difference stationary. Finally, the long run impact of the t
structural shocks on the endogenous variables has a recursive structure, and we use this property
to identify the shocks.
Identification of the Shocks
Since the vector ￿X is covariance stationary, it can be written as an infinite moving t
average process in the structural shocks:
where A(L) is a matrix whose elements are polynomials in the lag operator L. Denote the
elements of A(L) by a (L). The time path of the effects of a shock in ￿ on variable i after k periods ij j
can be denoted ￿ (k). We also adopt the notation such that A(1) is the matrix of long run effects ij
whose elements are denoted a (1); each element gives the cumulative effect of a shock in ￿ on ij j
variable i over time. Similarly, A  is the matrix of the contemporaneous impact effects.  The 0
objective of identification is to discern the 25 elements of A . Given the model structure above, 0
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In equation (21), the matrix of long run effects is lower triangular. Since the variance-covariance
matrix is symmetric, it provides 15 restrictions on the elements of the A  matrix. Equation (21)  0
provides the ten additional restrictions to recover the structural shocks.
V. Empirical Results
The data are quarterly from 1980:1 through 2002:3. The measures of the variables are: rt
= terms of trade (relative price of exports in terms of imports), y  = GDP in constant prices, d =  tt
the budget deficit, q = real exchange rate measured as the SDR exchange rate deflated by the t
consumer price index, p  = consumer price index. Data sources are explained in the Appendix. t
In order to properly specify the VAR, variables ought to be tested for unit roots. We use
the KPSS test, which tests stationarity as the null hypothesis, and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) test with a unit root null hypothesis. The maximum lag in the ADF test is determined by
pairing down the model starting with a maximum lag of 10, depending on whether the maximum
lag coefficient is significant at the 10% significance level. The test results for all variables in levels
and first differences are given in Table 2.16
( Insert Table 2 about here )
Statistical evidence in the table points to nonstationary variables in levels. The ADF test
fails to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all variables at the 5 percent significance level.
The KPSS test concurs except for the terms of trade which seems stationary. As for first
differences of the variables, all seem stationary except the inflation rate. For the empirical model,
we proceed with the assumption that all variables are difference stationary except for the inflation
rate, which is a unit root process, hence the vector ∆X = [∆r ∆y ∆d ∆q ∆π] is stationary, where t ttttt
π is the inflation rate.  t
In order to account for seasonality in the data, we include three seasonal dummies in the
VAR, denoted, s. As an initial step, we estimate the VAR with 8 lags . We then test whether the i
3
model can be pared down using likelihood ratio tests. The null hypothesis of a VAR(7) cannot be
rejected against a VAR(8) as the test statistic is, χ (25) = 32.56. However, the test statistic for the
2
null hypothesis of VAR(6) against VAR(7) yields χ (25) = 34.64 rejecting VAR(6) at the 10
2
percent significance level. Hence we conclude 7 lags are appropriate for the empirical model.
Table 3 presents the VAR estimation results. Even though it is hard to interpret the coefficients
directly, the statistics may give an idea about model adequacy. For example, some coefficients on
higher order lags are highly significant indicating that a VAR with 7 lags is justified. Moreover,
the Ljung-Box Q-statistics for 24  order serial correlation fail to reject serially uncorrelated
th
residuals except for the residual in the real exchange rate equation, which seems to be serially
correlated with a 7.8 percent marginal significance level. Given degrees of freedom considerations
and likelihood ratio tests presented above for the order of the VAR, 7 lags seem adequate to17
capture the dynamics in the data.  After imposing the identification restrictions implied by
equation (21), we present impulse response functions and variance decompositions  to assess the
dynamic effects of each shock.
V.1. Impulse Response Functions
Figure 3 presents responses of inflation and output to each shock (terms of trade, supply,
fiscal, balance of payments, and monetary). We present the median responses and 10%-90%  
bands based on bootstrapping with 1000 draws for the impulse response functions. Figure 3a
indicates that in response to a terms of trade shock, inflation rises. The inflation rate falls in
response to a supply shock but the responses are not statistically significant. The effect of fiscal
shocks on inflation is insignificant. On the other hand, the impact effect of a BOP shock on
inflation is negative. Finally,  inflation responds positively and significantly to a monetary shock.
Notice that monetary shocks have everlasting effects on inflation. This points to inflation inertia
which may be due to the existence of backward looking expectations in contracts for wages, sales,
rents etc. in the economy.
( Insert Figure 3 about here )
Output responses to various shocks are given in Figure 3b. The output response to a terms
of trade shock (an increase in the relative price of exportables) is a pronounced and significant
increase in output. Note that terms of trade shocks have permanent effects on output. Output
responds positively and significantly to a supply shock and reaches its long-run level within the
second year. Although output responds to a fiscal shock by alternating between contraction and
expansion, the response is not significant. Both inflation and output fall in response to a balance of18
payments deterioration; the response is not significant except for the impact effects. It is apparent
from the figure that a balance of payments deterioration has a demand deflationary effect on
inflation and output. Similarly the output response to a monetary shock is significant. This is in
line with Agenor and Hoffmaister (1997) who found that a monetary shock has significant
expansionary short term effect on output. Overall, the responses of inflation and output conform
to the predictions of a conventional aggregate supply - aggregate demand framework.
V.2. Variance Decompositions
Table 4 presents the decomposition of the forecast error variance of inflation and output
for forecast horizons up to six years, and in the long run where the forecast horizon tends to
infinity. It is evident from Table 4 that terms of trade, balance of payments, and monetary shocks
figure prominently in the inflationary process in Turkey. Note that fiscal deficit shocks play a
somewhat limited role.  This may be due to data limitations which preclude us from using a
comprehensive measure of the public sector deficits such as the “public sector borrowing
requirements” which is not available on a quarterly basis. While in the short run terms of trade
shocks are important, in the long run balance of payments and monetary shocks dominate. This
conforms to evidence presented by Atesoglu and Dutkowsky (1995) in that monetary policy in
Turkey is neutral with unitary elasticity between money and prices. Our work differs from Onis
and Ozmucur (1990) in that supply shocks seem to have negligible effects on inflation. The effect
of terms of trade shocks is understandable for a country which imports a substantial part of raw
materials, oil, machinery, and equipment. On the other hand, balance of payments shocks
necessitate devaluations of domestic currency which translate into increases in aggregate demand19
for domestic output. Moreover, devaluations affect domestic prices directly depending on the
degree of exchange rate pass-through. Recent evidence by Leigh and Rossi (2002) suggests that
exchange rate pass-through in Turkey is pronounced in the short run particularly for wholesale
prices as compared to other key emerging markets.
( Insert Table 3 about here )
The right hand side of Table 4 gives the variance decomposition of output. For forecast
horizons up to one year, output is influenced by supply shocks, followed by terms of trade,
balance of payments, and monetary disturbances. At medium to long term forecasting horizons,
output is mainly driven by terms of trade and supply shocks.  The effect of terms of trade shocks
on output can be explained by the relative openness of the Turkish economy in the last two
decades. Indeed, if we use the ratio of imports and exports to GDP as a crude measure of the
openness, the Turkish economy was virtually closed prior to 1980 as the ratio was 8.3 percent in
1979. The openness ratio climbed to an average of 19.2 percent in 1980-82, 27.5 percent in 1987-
89, and 42.9 percent in 1999-2001 .
4
Monetary shocks do have an expansionary output effect albeit a limited one. Except for
the impact effect, monetary shocks are not significant in influencing output. In a sustained
inflationary environment short of hyperinflation, the element of surprise associated with
efficacious aggregate demand policies is absent. Moreover, inflation and inflationary expectations
limit rigidities that normally are credited with expansionary aggregate demand. This is in line with
Atesoglu and Dutkowsky (1995) who found that none of the aggregate demand variables
significantly affect output in Turkey. The lack of pronounced effects of aggregate demand shocks20
on output provides preliminary evidence that a disinflationary program may not involve significant
output losses. 
V.3. Core Inflation
Following Quah and Vahey (1995), we construct “core inflation” by eliminating supply
side influences (terms of trade shocks and supply shocks). The remaining “aggregate demand
driven inflation” based on historical realizations of balance-of-payments shocks, fiscal shocks, and
monetary shocks gives an idea about the extent of policy-induced inflation.  The simulations of
5
core inflation include the base projection. If a substantial portion of actual inflation is demand-
driven or “core inflation”, there is room for a successful stabilization program to bring down
inflation. This assumes authorities have some discretion on demand side shocks compared to
supply side shocks where the latter can be thought of as exogenous.
( Insert Figure 4 about here )
A decomposition of inflation based on historical realizations of the shocks is given in
Figure 4. This figure reveals several interesting features of the high inflation period in Turkey.
First, there is a moderating effect of favorable supply side shocks on total inflation between 1985-
1988, and 1994-1997. These can partially be attributed to favorable oil price shocks. Second, and
most important, core inflation was never far below total inflation during the entire sample period.
Finally, the spike in the inflation rate in 1994 seems to have been mostly driven by a “core”
impulse. 
Given the negligible non-core inflation and oftentimes moderating supply side influences21
on inflation, the historical decomposition of inflation has some policy implications. If we assume
that core inflation is mostly induced by demand policies, then stabilizing aggregate demand has a
good chance of stabilizing inflation.
VI. Conclusions
Using a dynamic aggregate supply and aggregate demand model with imperfect capital
mobility and structural VARs, we decompose inflation and output movements into those
attributable to terms of trade, supply, balance-of-payments, fiscal, and monetary shocks. Empirical
results show that terms of trade shocks have a significant effect on inflation in the short run. In the
long run, monetary, and balance of payments shocks dominate. Budget deficits play a limited role
in the inflationary process.  Moreover, demand shocks have limited effects on output movements;
output is mostly driven by terms of trade and supply shocks.
When inflation runs high for a sustained period of time, inflationary expectations and
inflation inertia play a significant role in inflation dynamics. Recently Dibooglu (2002) showed
that inflationary expectations have forward- and backward-looking elements in Turkey. A key
result of the study is that forward expectations dominate; as such the output costs of a credible
disinflation program are likely to be limited. Indeed the limited effects of aggregate demand
shocks on output in this paper also provide evidence that a credible disinflation program may not
have significant output costs. The lack of political determination to undertake timely  structural
reforms fed inflationary expectations. It can be said that Turkish macroeconomic policies in the
1980s and 1990s reflected a preference toward expansionary policies at the expense of price
stability. When governments in Turkey faced a choice between responding to the immediate needs22
of their constituents and reforms necessary for sustainable long-run growth, they opted for the
first, and quite predictably, Turkey became one of few countries in history to have a high
sustained inflation short of hyperinflation for more than two decades.
The fact that a major component of inflation is demand driven core inflation highlights the
importance of structural reforms and credible commitment mechanisms that restrain discretionary
aggregate demand polices. To the extent that recent government programs resolve the credible
commitment problem and are accompanied by structural reforms, they can bring the high inflation
era to an end, and stabilize the economy.23
Appendix: Data Sources
(1) Price indexes for exports and imports: For 1980:1-1981:4: IMF’s International Financial
Statistics (IFS), CD-ROM Version, December 2002, IFS lines 74.d and 75.d, 1980=100. For
1982:1-2002:3: State Institute of Statistics, Ankara, 1994=100, retrieved from the Electronic
Data Distribution System of the Turkish Central Bank at: http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html.
(2) Real GDP: State Institute of Statistics (SIS), Ankara, in 1987 prices, expenditure based,
millions of Turkish lira. The data for 1987:1-2002.3 is retrieved from the Electronic Data
Distribution System of the Turkish Central Bank at: http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html. The data
for 1980.1-1986:4 is provided by the officials of the SIS upon authors’ request.
(3) Consolidated budget deficit: Ministry of Finance, Ankara, billions of 
Turkish lira. The data for 1985:1-2002.3 is retrieved from the Electronic Data Distribution
System of the Turkish Central Bank at: http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html. The data for 1980.1-
1984:4 is taken from Ministry of Finance’s Annual Economic Reports, various issues.
(4) SDR exchange rate: IMF’s International Financial Statistics, CD-ROM Version, December
2002, IFS line aa, Turkish lira per SDR.
(5) Consumer price index (CPI): IMF’s International Financial Statistics, CD-ROM Version,
IFS line 64.24
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1. The subsequent increase in FED may be interpreted as a gross indication of rising currency
substitution in Turkey.
3. Although ε  is labeled a “balance of payments shock”, it is evident that it captures foreign t
z
interest rate shocks, risk premium shocks, and competitiveness shocks. Without further structure,
it is impossible to disentangle ε  into its constituent parts. To keep the dimensions of the VAR t
z
tractable, ε  will be a composite shock of the above. t
z
3. The estimations in this paper are carried out using the RATS software, version 5.
4. Based on data from the State Institute of Statistics and the Central Bank of the Republic of
Turkey. 
5. Demand-driven inflation is only an approximation to policy induced inflation as not all broadly
defined demand shocks are policy related.





















































 1980-84    51.5     3.5     65.5     9.3     14.3     60.8     8.7     53.7     0.8  -  1 931.6     72.6 
 1985-89    50.1     4.6     42.7  -   4.7  -   5.0     54.3     3.6     66.3     13.6  -   145.4  -   104.8 
 1990-94    73.8     3.8     75.7  -   0.5  -   1.6     69.8  -   2.8     94.6     14.7  -  1 430.2  -   164.0 
 1995-99    81.0     4.0     70.2  -   5.7     5.3     104.7     13.4     117.9     21.9  -  1 358.0    1 726.0 
 2000-02*    50.9     2.2     55.9     3.0     15.0     34.8  -   10.9     31.0  -   13.8  -  1 943.0  -  2 595.7 
 1980-2002*    62.4     3.8     62.5     0.0     4.8     67.5     3.5     76.3     9.3  -  1 311.1  -   6.0  
 
Source: State Institute of Statistics, Central Bank of Turkey, and State Planning Organization; our calculations. 
* The figures for 2002 are preliminary. 
 
 Table 2. KPSS and ADF Statistics
qp d y r tt t t t
KPSS η  Statistic µ
Levels 1.19 1.89 1.45 1.83 0.36
First Differences 0.04 0.63 0.03 0.04 0.14
ADF τ  Statistic µ
Levels -1.31 (3) -0.48 (8) 0.48 (7) -2.21 (8) -1.50 (10)
First Differences -7.13 (2) -1.58 (7) -7.21(6) -3.31 (10) -4.06 (9)
Notes:  Critical values for the KPSS ￿  test at the 10 % level is 0.35 and at the 5 % level is 0.46. µ
The critical value of the ADF ￿  test at the 5 % level is -2.89.  Lag truncation for the KPSS test is µ
set at l = 4. The maximum lag for the ADF test is given in parenthesis.Table 3. VAR Estimation Results
Dependent Variable
 ￿r ￿y ￿d ￿q  ￿￿ tt tt t
￿r 0.024 -0.089 0.130 0.072 0.066 t-1
￿r -0.130 0.257* 0.207 -0.123 0.019 t-2
￿r -0.091 0.010 -0.004 -0.135 0.175 t-3
￿r -0.162 -0.034 -0.013 -0.088 0.112 t-4
￿r 0.101 0.074 0.019 0.053 0.064 t-5
￿r 0.111 0.134 0.009 0.052 -0.002 t-6
￿r -0.033 0.149 -0.097 -0.313 0.137 t-7
￿y 0.303* -0.368** -0.043 0.144 0.243* t-1
￿y 0.246 -0.172 -0.331* 0.036 0.015 t-2
￿y 0.159 -0.201 -0.353* 0.689* 0.026 t-3
￿y 0.249 0.227 -0.174 0.348 -0.086 t-4
￿y -0.087 -0.056 0.017 0.320 -0.025 t-5
￿y 0.020 -0.380** 0.110 0.391 -0.100 t-6
￿y 0.130 -0.227 0.035 -0.071 0.139 t-7
￿d -0.082 -0.056 -0.858** 0.427 0.039 t-1
￿d -0.137 -0.158 -0.723** -0.064 -0.049 t-2
￿d -0.090 -0.006 -0.558** -0.006 0.046 t-3
￿d -0.184 0.090 -0.494** 0.589 -0.038 t-4
￿d -0.060 0.026 -0.245 0.160 -0.011 t-5
￿d 0.092 0.125 0.006 0.107 -0.076 t-6
￿d -0.007 0.254* -0.053 -0.136 0.009 t-7
￿q -0.131 -0.214** -0.045 0.245 0.398** t-1
￿q 0.013 0.061 -0.018 -0.185 0.016 t-2
￿q 0.160 -0.035 -0.142 -0.127 0.028 t-3
￿q -0.022 0.285** 0.065 0.263 0.007 t-4
￿q 0.013 0.037 -0.168 -0.252 -0.088 t-5
￿q 0.072 -0.100 0.162 0.399* -0.067 t-6
￿q -0.110 0.197 -0.004 -0.117 0.127 t-7
 ￿￿ -0.090 -0.123 0.204 0.382 -0.673** t-1
￿￿ -0.273 0.045 0.508* -0.043 -0.543** t-2
￿￿ -0.238 -0.267 0.216 -0.482 -0.301 t-3
￿￿ -0.431* -0.191 0.081 0.153 -0.225 t-4
￿￿ -0.454* -0.205 -0.328 -0.299 -0.064 t-5
￿￿ -0.157 -0.521** -0.022 0.254 -0.087 t-6
￿￿ 0.007 -0.284** -0.144 -0.247 -0.029 t-7
 s 0.032 0.041 0.120* 0.016 0.046 1
 s -0.014 0.116* 0.063 -0.037 0.003 2
 s -0.014 0.132** -0.067 0.175 -0.007 3
 c -0.009 -0.049 -0.016 -0.062 -0.009
Q(24) 20.39 27.36 22.06 34.38* 30.55
Notes: (*) and (**) indicate significance at the 10 and 5 percent levels respectively.
Q(k) gives the Ljung-Box statistic for up to k  order residual serial correlation.
thTable 4. Variance Decomposition of Inflation and Output
Inflation Output
k ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
rsfz m rsfz m
1 29.8 5.1 1.2 17.4 46.5 10.0 72.3 0.1 5.4 12.1
4 21.8 4.1 7.4 24.7 42.0 21.8 54.4 1.6 15.8 6.3
8 18.9 5.3 10.1 23.0 42.7 32.9 47.1 1.7 11.0 7.3
12 17.3 5.7 12.0 25.3 39.7 35.4 47.3 1.8 8.9 6.6
16 15.7 5.1 13.0 24.3 42.0 34.9 50.0 1.6 7.8 5.7
20 14.5 5.0 12.4 24.4 43.7 36.1 49.4 1.5 7.0 5.9
24 13.1 4.6 12.6 25.9 43.8 36.5 50.2 1.5 6.3 5.6







































































































































































































































































Source: State Institute of Statistics; our calculations. 
Note: Horizontal lines show selected period averages. 
 
 


























































































































































Source: State Institute of Statistics; our calculations. 
Note: The figure for 2002 is only estimation. Figure 3. Responses of Inflation and Output to Various Shocks
Inflation Responses Output Responses














































































monetaryFigure 4. Core and non-core Inflation
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